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The MK 16 MOD Underwater Breathing Apparatus (UBA)
provides life support to EOD divers operating in close
proximity to sensitive underwater ordnance. This thesis
evaluates the acquisition and logistic strategy used in
fielding this acquisition category III system. In addition,
current material and logistic support problems were examined
and analyzed. The final chapter provides conclusions and
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I . INTRODUCTION
A. OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH
The acquisition strategy for obtaining a new weapon system
to satisfy an approved mission need is "the conceptual basis
of the overall plan that a Program Manager follows in program
execution." [Ref. l:p. 3-1]
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the acquisition
strategy used in developing and fielding the MK 16 MOD
Underwater Breathing Apparatus (UBA). It will evaluate the
decisions made in formulating this strategy and their effect
upon current design and material support. In addition, it will
also examine and evaluate the Integrated Logistics Support Plan




The primary research question was: What "lessons learned"
could be used to improve the development and fielding of future
systems by the Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Program
Office?
Secondary research questions were:
1. What were the acquisition and logistic decisions that
resulted in the current system?
2. What material support problems were encountered in the
fielding of this system?
3. What additional resources are needed by the EOD Program
Office and other activities in developing and fielding
future systems in an effective manner?
C. RESEARCH METHODLOGY
The research for this thesis was done in three parts.
First, a review of the literature pertaining to the fielding
of an ACAT III system was done. Current Department of Defense
(DoD) instructions, regulations and policy were reviewed.
Second, interviews with personnel from the EOD Program Office,
EOD Technology Center and other DoD agencies were conducted.
Third, information and data gathered from steps one and two
were analyzed and evaluated.
D. THESIS STRUCTURE
This thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter I
provides an introduction and describes how the UBA hardware
operates. This description will help the reader to understand
concepts discussed in the remainder of this thesis. Chapter
II provides a general history of the UBAs that were in use
before the MK 16 and discusses why development of the MK 16
was required. In addition, the acquisition history of the MK
16 is described. Chapter III examines the acquisition strategy
and integrated logistics plan used in developing the MK 16 MOD
UBA. A baseline is established from which the MK 16
acquisition strategy and the integrated logistic support plan
can be discussed. In addition, an integrated logistics support
planning process is described for the conceptual development
of an ILSP. Chapter IV discusses the "lessons learned" from
the research for this thesis. Chapter V presents the author's
observations, conclusions and recommendations.
E. GENERAL DESCRIPTION
The MK 16 MOD O UBA is a low-influence signature (LIS),
closed-circuit, mixed-gas, constant partial pressure of oxygen,
underwater life-support system. It was developed to support
the low magnetic and acoustic signature requirements of EOD
operations. The MK 16 MOD UBA is illustrated in Figures 1
and 2. Figure 1 is a drawing of the UBA itself and Figure 2
is a picture of the equipment as worn by a diver.
The breathing medium of this new equipment is kept at a
predetermined partial pressure of oxygen by oxygen sensors that
monitor, evaluate, and control the oxygen level via a battery-
operated electronic module. The apparatus controls the oxygen
partial pressure in the diver's breathing mix at a preset level
independent of depth. It incorporates manual overrides
(shutoff and bypass valves) for the automatic system as an
added safety feature.
The MK 16 MOD UBA with the necessary auxiliary equipment
provides life support to EOD divers to a maximum depth of 300

























(Courtesy of EOD Program Office)
Figure 2
MK 16 MOD O UBA WORN BY DIVER
(Courtesy of EOD Office)
the purpose of performing ordnance disposal or recovery tasks
against mines that are activated either magnetically or
acoustically. [Ref. 2:pp. 1-5]
F. FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTION
The MK 16 is a closed circuit system which recirculates the
diver's respiratory gas. A scrubber assembly removes CO2
exhaled with each breath. The breathing gas is retained within
the equipment except during ascent; or when the diver has
manually added gas; or during normal operation when the
breathing loop pressure is greater than the surrounding
atmospheric/water pressure, at which time excess pressure is
vented. Oxygen (Oj) is mixed with a diluent gas (airC^Oj)) or
helium/oxygen (HeOj) to maintain a preset partial pressure of
oxygen (PPOj) of 0.75 ATM.
The normal working dive limit is 150 feet (46 meters) of
seawater when NjOj is used as the breathing medium and 300 feet
(91 meters) of seawater when HeOj is used as the breathing
medium.
An adult usually consumes between 0.25 and 3.0 liters of
oxygen per minute, depending on activity level. Tests have
shown over an extended period of time, a hard working diver
will consume an average 1.2 liters of oxygen per minute.
Therefore, for a six-hour dive, a closed circuit system need
only supply approximately 15 cubic feet (424 liters) of oxygen
to meet diver respiratory needs. The MK 16 can store
approximately 21 cubic feet (594 liters) of oxygen at 3,000
psig (20,684 kPa), providing an adequate supply for a six-hour
dive. The major limiting factor for the MK 16 is the C02
absorbent capability. The absorbent duration is directly
related to the environmental operating temperature and depth.
Absorbent duration decreases as temperature decreases and depth
increases. [Ref. 3:p. 4]
G. RECIRCULATION SYSTEM
Figure 3 is a functional block diagram of the MK 16. The
diver exhales into the mouthpiece (1), the exhaled gas passes
through the exhalation hose (2), through a moisture absorber
and support screen (3) and through a bed of absorbent granules
in the scrubber (4), where CO* is removed. The gas then passes
through a second moisture absorber and support screen (5), over
the oxygen sensor assembly (6), into the diaphragm assembly (7)
and back to the diver through the inhalation hose (8).
H. ANALYSIS AND CONTROL
The primary electronics assembly (9), powered by the
battery (10), monitors the PP0
2
in the recirculating gas by
means of three oxygen sensors (refer to Figure 3). This
information appears on the primary display (11) to indicate a
low, normal or high level of oxygen. Once every five seconds,



















































MK 16 MOD O UBA Functional Block Diagram
(Courtesy of EOD Program Office)
the set-point value. A PPO2 value less than the set-point
value automatically opens the oxygen addition valve (12) in the
oxygen supply line to admit oxygen to the system. The
regulator (13) maintains the preset pressure level. Oxygen is
stored in a spherical bottle (14), fitted with a manual shutoff
valve (15). The oxygen bypass valve (16) allows manual
addition of oxygen to the breathing gas when required. The
oxygen pressure gauge (17) displays oxygen bottle pressure.
I. DILUENT GAS SUPPLY
As the diver descends (See Figure 3), increased water
pressure causes the diaphragm to partially collapse, which
activates the diluent addition valve (18). Diluent gas enters
the breathing loop equalizing the pressure differential
existing between the gas in the recirculating system and the
ambient water. During ascent, water pressure decreases causing
the gas inside the diaphragm to expand. The dump valve (19)
opens to relieve the excess pressure within the breathing loop,
thus equalizing the pressure differential between the breathing
loop and the ambient water. The diluent gas is contained in
a spherical bottle (20), fitted with a manual shutoff valve
(21) and regulator (22). A bypass valve (23) allows direct
addition of diluent to the breathing loop when required. A
pressure gauge (24) provides visual indication of diluent gas
bottle pressure.
J. PRIMARY DISPLAY
The primary display assembly provides qualitative data
indications to the diver relative to the PPO2 in the breathing
loop and primary battery condition through coded red and green
light signals. The primary display consists of two light
emitting diodes (red and green) and a clear cylindrical housing
is connected to the electronics assembly by a cable and
connector. The display is normally mounted on the right side
of the nonmagnetic face mask by means of a detachable mounting
bracket
.
K. SECONDARY DISPLAY ASSEMBLY
The secondary display assembly is normally attached to the
divers harness assembly. It consists of a back-lighted liquid
crystal display, electronic circuits, four 1.5 volt batteries,
a cylindrical housing and is connected directly to the oxygen
sensors and primary electronics assembly by a cable and
connector. Its function is to provide quantitative information
to the diver by presenting the PPO2 numerically for each of the
three oxygen sensors, the primary battery's percentage of
remaining usable power, and indicates the secondary batteries'
condition. [Ref. 3:pp. 4-7]
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I I . BACKGROUND
A. GENERAL HISTORY
Prior to the introduction of the MK 16, EOD Groups One and
Two were using the MK VI, a semi-closed circuit UBA. This UBA,
introduced in 1963, emitted gas bubbles and provided borderline
magnetic and acoustic safety for the diver. In addition, the
MK VI breathing resistance, canister duration, and decom-
pression profiles provided minimal safety for the diver. In
1979 logistic support was stopped for the MK VI and marginal
mission capability was being maintained through cannibalization
of fleet assets.
The MK 16 was designed to replace the MK VI. The MK 16 is
a nonmagnetic, acoustically quiet, closed circuit, mixed gas
underwater breathing apparatus, born of a complete redesign of
its military predecessor, the MK 15 and its commercial
counterpart, the CCR-1000. The MK 15 is similar to the MK 16,
however, it is a magnetic vice nonmagnetic UBA. It is used by
Navy Seal teams for specialized operations in support of their
mission. The MK 16*s primary application is in mine counter-
measure diving. Because the UBA is nonmagnetic and
acoustically quiet, its primary mission is to allow divers to
render safe, recover or dispose of influence (magnetically or
acoustically) detonated mines.
11
It is a commonly held misconception that the MK 16 is a
nonmagnetic version of the MK 15. The MK 16 resembles the Mk
15 in outward appearance only. The MK 15 UBA was developed
for Navy Special Warfare forces and its mission is entirely
different from that of the MK 16. In addition, the MK 15 did
not meet the magnetic signature requirements of a system to be
used in a mine countermeasure environment. Both the MK 15 and
MK 16 function by maintaining a constant partial pressure of
oxygen (PPCM through the breathing loop; but the MK 16 is a
significant advance over the MK 15 and is without a doubt the
most advanced UBA in the world today. [Ref. 4
: pp . 7-9]
B. ACQUISITION HISTORY
The MK 16 UBA was developed in response to Operational
Requirement (OR) SSL-01 and as an integral part of the EOD
Underwater Support System (NDCP S1317-SW) dated 30 July 1979.
Figure 4, shows the MK 16 MOD program schedule. Naval
Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technology Center (NAVEODTECHCEN)
,
Indian Head, Maryland conducted exploratory development of an
underwater breathing apparatus using closed-circuit constant
partial pressure of oxygen (PPO*) technology. Initial research
was conducted under R&D funding in 1968 and 1972 by General
Electric and Westinghouse respectively. In years 1975 through
1977 Rexnord took over the primary Research and Development.
12
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TECHEVAL: June 1980 June 1980
Complete OT-III
OPEVAL: November 1980 November 1980
Approval for
Service use: March 1981 October 1981
First Production
Contract Award: March 1981 October 1982
Provisioning
Conference: July 1981 March 1985
Complete 1st
Prod. Deliveries: December 1981 October 1985
Commence Training
at NAVSCOLEOD: February 1982 July 1985
2nd Production
Contract Award: February 1982 April 1986
2nd "K" Delivered: December 1982 May 1989
Navy Support
Date: February 1983 *1991 (Proposed)*
3rd Prod."K" Award: February 1983 *TBD*
Deliv. 3rd Prod."K": December 1983 *TBD*
Figure 4
MK 16 MOD O Program Structure
(Courtesy of EOD Program Office)
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Development of the first successful rebreather started at
General Electric (GE) around June of 1968 and was successfully
completed at Duke University before the end of the year.
During January of 1969 all of the key members of General
Electric left to form a new company called Marine Systems
International which was later renamed Rexnord. One of the
first developments of Rexnord was the design of a completely
new rebreather called the CCR-1000. The first three units went
to the Army special forces in 1969 for test and evaluation.
In 1970, Rexnord designed and built the first closed
circuit rebreather for Westinghouse Inc. An objective of this
effort was to design a unit to resemble the Westinghouse MK II
Abalone semi-closed unit which Westinghouse was then building
for the Navy. Early in 1972, the Navy tested all of the
commercially available models (the Rexnord CCR-1000, the
Westinghouse unit designed by Rexnord, the General Electric
unit and the Beckman Electro-Lung). The Navy determined that
all, with the exception of the Beckman unit, were potentially
acceptable for Navy use. Based on these evaluations and
developmental testing, the Navy prepared a specification.
In August of 1972, it came to the attention of Rexnord that
the Navy was contemplating a sole source procurement of the GE
unit for deep diving use. Rexnord objected to this, as they
felt their UBA was technically superior to the GE unit and less
expensive. In 1974, the Naval Sea Systems Command included
14
Rexnord, GE and Westinghouse in a competition for a closed
circuit mixed gas rebreather to be used for in-shore warfare.
Both Westinghouse and GE decided to get out of the closed
circuit rebreather business and elected not to bid. As a
result of this decision by Westinghouse and GE to withdraw from
bidding, Rexnord was the only contractor to submit a proposal .
Two prototypes were acquired from Rexnord under contract
N00174-77C-0187. NAVEODTECHCEN completed test and evaluation
of the feasibility models in 1978. The total amount for this
R&D effort was approximately $1,095,430.00 dollars (hardware
cost only)
.
A contract specification was then prepared for the
acquisition of seven full scale development models. Contract
N00024-79-C-6170 was awarded to Rexnord, Inc. on 25 May 1979
for their fabrication. The resulting life support equipment
was designated the MK 16 MOD UBA. Delivery of the seven
models was completed by the end of April 1980. DT-111 TECHEVAL
was completed in June and OT-111 OPEVAL was conducted in
October 1980.
CHNAVMAT approved the MK 16 for service use (ASU) in
October 1981. This was documented in ASU Action Sheet File No.
80-00152 and satisfied the requirements at that time for full
production (AFP)
.
Initial procurement of the MK 16 MOD UBA occurred on 29
October 1982 under contract N00024-83-C-4077 . This was a sole
15
source procurement order awarded to Rexnord Process Control
Division for 96 units. The contract price for these 96 units
was $3,024,000.00 dollars ($31,500 per unit).
Toward the latter part of 1984 a major problem was
discovered which delayed production of the MK 16. In December
1984, Lee Valve Company, the major supplier of the
piezoelectric oxygen addition valve, ceased manufacturing the
part after it failed to meet Navy specifications during
government testing. The MK 16 UBA production program resumed
six months later, when the first components were delivered from
the new valve supplier, Grindley Manufacturing Company to
Rexnord. Due to this delay first article testing didn't start
until 17 April 1985. NAVSCOLEOD commenced training in July
1985 and delivery of the first operational MK 16 units to the
fleet started in October 1985. [Ref. 5




The purpose of this chapter is to evaluate the acquisition
strategy and integrated logistics support plan (ILSP) used in
fielding this ACAT III system. However, before the acquisition
strategy or the ILSP are discussed, an understanding of the
following concepts is essential:
1. Acquisition Strategy Purpose.
2. Acquisition Strategy Development.
3. Acquisition Strategy Structure.
4. Acquisition Strategic Concerns.
5. Acquisition Technical Concerns.
6. Acquisition Resource Concerns.
7. Acquisition Strategy Criteria.
8. Acquisition Strategy Constraints and Limitations.
An understanding of the above concepts will help the reader
establish a baseline from which the MK 16 program can be
evaluated. In addition, an understanding of these concepts
will help the reader understand the many variables the Program
Manager has to deal with in the development and execution of
an acquisition strategy and ILSP. During the research for this
thesis, one article clearly stood out from the others on how
to develop an acquisition strategy. The article was written
by Dr. David V. Lamm (Associate Professor, Naval Postgraduate
17
School), and is entitled, "Acquisition Strategy". The material
from his article is used extensively in the following sections
to develop a baseline from which to discuss the MK 16
acquisition strategy and ILSP.
B. PRIMARY PURPOSE OF AM ACQUISITION STRATEGY
The primary purpose of an acquisition strategy is to,
"prioritize and integrate many diverse functional requirements,
to evaluate and select from among the important issue
alternatives, to identify the opportunities and times for
critical decisions (decision windows), and to provide a
coordinated approach to achieving program objectives
economically and effectively." [Ref. l:p. 3-2]
Every program acquisition strategy is developed on an
individual basis. Each one is different from the other. The
acquisition strategy is used as a road map for program planning
and execution. It is a living document that changes as new
information is obtained during the conduct of the program.
[Ref. l:p. 3-2]
C. ACQUISTITION STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT
In recent years, the policy regarding the development and
use of an acquisition strategy has become more specific and
more demanding. However, this acquisition development process
has not resulted in a clear definition of acquisition strategy,
nor has it resulted in a uniform application of DoD policy
18
guidelines. Dr. Lamm found that all successful acquisition
strategies must contain certain characteristics. He stated
that the acquisition strategy must be: (1) a reflection of the
management concepts used in the execution of the program: (2)
realistic; (3) comprehensive; (4) integrated and internally
consistent; (5) flexible, and; (6) serve as a formal agreement.
[Ref. 6:p. 91]
The process of developing an acquisition strategy involves;
(1) determining guidance, the Program Manager will assimilate,
integrate and implement planning guidance received from formal
and informal sources; (2) identifying what is to be
accomplished, why and when it must be completed and by whom;
(3) identifying and evaluating strategic alternatives; (4)
selecting an appropriate strategy, and; (5) developing
contingent strategies. [Ref. 6:p. 91]
Acquisition strategies must be initiated during the early
part of the Concept Exploration phase when very little is known
regarding system configuration, integrated logistics support
requirements, costs, and many other important factors. [Ref.
6:p. 91] It is noteworthy to add that decisions made very
early in a program determine the costs throughout the life of
the system. Figure 5 shows the impact of decisions on life-
cycle costs compared against actual expenditures. Decisions
made during the concept exploration phase ( especially the
19














Life-Cycle-Cost Decision Impact and Expenditures
(Source: Acquisition Strategy Guide, DSMC, Ft. Belvoir)
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decisions as to which concept is selected and what the
performance thresholds for reliability, maintainability, etc.,
are) fix 70% of the life-cycle costs. In addition, roughly 85%
of the LCC are frozen before the Full-Scale Development phase
begins, when only a small percentage of the total system
acquisition cost has been expended. [Ref. 7:p. 1-8] An
acquisition strategy helps in structuring the decision process
and ensures that the right decision is made at the right time.
1. Discussion
The cornerstone of the MK 16 acquisition strategy was
based on the assumption that the MK 16 was a redesign of the
MK 15 . This decision/assumption affected every strategic
consideration and requirement. In addition, the Program
Manager made the decision that a formal "LSA" and "system
engineering approach", specifically for the MK 16, was not
warranted. [Ref. 5:pp. 3-4]
In March 1988, COMNAVSURFGRU MIDPAC reported in a
message to COMNAVSURFPAC that significant material problems
exist with the MK 16 MOD O UBA (COMNAVSURFGRU MIDPAC Msg
R150716Z Mar. 88). This chapter will show that these problems
were partly due to an over-reliance on the experience/history
of the MK 15 program.
21
D. ACQUISITION STRATEGY STRUCTURE
Figure 6 is an overview of the conceptual basis for
acquisition strategy development. As shown in Figure 6, there
are a number of strategic and functional elements that must be
considered. In the acquisition strategy development it is
necessary to identify those elements which are critical to the
program and select alternatives and decision time intervals
that meet program objectives and strategy criteria. This set
of alternatives and time intervals is the acquisition strategy,
which provides the direction for the development of functional
plans such as the TEMP and ILSP. These plans provide the
direction and control for program execution. [Ref. l:p. 3-2]
E. ACQUISITION STRATEGY CONCERNS
Ideally, the Program Manager should be the program
strategist. However, in many programs, strategy, or aspects
of strategy, are dictated by higher authority. Nevertheless,
the program manager must be fully aware of the elements of
strategic concern and must make every effort to change a
dictated strategy that pushes the program beyond the limits of
a feasible solution. [Ref. l:p. 3-5] To meet the responsi-
bility for formulating and executing the overall acquisition
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Overview of the Conceptual Basis for
Developing an Acquisition Strategy
(Source: Acquisition Strategy Guide, DSMC, Ft. Belvoir)
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1. The national objectives.
2. The nature of the threat, the need, and the
technology base.
3. The program objectives, constraints and
priorities
.
4. The market factors.
5. The critical program issues. [Ref. l:p. 3-5]
F. ACQUISITION STRATEGY TECHNICAL CONCERNS
Four major elements have been identified as representing
the areas of technical concerns, they are:
1. Design.
2. Test and Evaluation.
3. Production.
4. Deployment.
The extent to which mission requirements and program
objectives can be met by existing technology will directly
determine program risk and resource needs. Each technical
element will require the development of nonconf 1 icting
strategies that must be integrated into the overall acquisition
strategy. [Ref. l:p. 3-6] The following subsections discuss
these four areas of technical concerns.
1 . Design
In the design strategy the mission requirements
stemming from the program objectives, mission profile, and
operational environment must be translated into system and then
24
item specifications through system engineering studies. In
addition to performance requirements, the strategy must address
how the design will satisfy operational suitability
requirements - e.g., readiness, safety, reliability, and
maintainability. Strategy alternatives include pre-planned
product improvement (PI), Technical Data Package (TDP), and
Warranties/Guarantees. [Ref. l:p. 3-6]
a. Discussion
The following is a discussion of the system
engineering process. It is a process by which an operational
need is transformed into a preferred system configuration.
This transformation is achieved by the iterative application
of functional analysis, synthesis, optimization, definition,
design, test and evaluation. Technical parameters for the
entire system are integrated to assure compatibility of all
physical, functional, and program interfaces. The goal is
system definition and design optimization. This process of
integration also combines reliability, maintainability,
logistic support, human factors and other related specialties
into the total engineering effort. [Ref. 7:p. 9]
In an acquisition program, the system engineering
approach includes performing the following tasks:
1. Identifying high-risk areas and continually assessing
their impact on the program.
2. Determining program technical requirements and
integrating the specialty efforts and such disciplines
as configuration management and data management.
25
3. Providing the rationale and the definitive specifications
for all hardware/software, facilities, and personnel
required to carry out and support contractual
requirements
.
4. Establishing appropriate baseline and management reviews
to permit effective engineering change control and
monitoring.
5. Establishing the rationale for ensuring that engineering
decisions leading to the selection of design alternatives
are based upon system/ end-product cost effectiveness
considerations
.
6. Planning system T&E programs to ensure meeting
development and mission requirements, evaluating
achievement, and reporting technical performance against
program objectives both for early identification of
problems and for visibility by management so that timely
corrective action can be taken.
7. Providing appropriate and timely redefinition of program
technical requirements in response to changes directed
by the customer or the problems identified through
evaluation of performance. [Ref. 8:p. 4-48]
In discussing the system engineering of the MK 16
with Mr. John Pennella (Project Engineer MK 16, NAVEODTECHCEN)
,
he said that no formal system engineering was done. Historical
data from the MK 15 and its civilian counterpart (CCR-1000) was
used to lock-in operational requirements for readiness,
reliability and maintainability. In addition, he indicated
that suboptimization rather than system optimization was
incorporated into the system engineering process used for the
MK 16.
Its obvious that deleting a requirement like system
engineering from an acquisition strategy, can save time and
money up front in a program. However, like a popular TV
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commercial for an oil filter says, you can either pay a little
now or a lot later. If the later payment is elected, it
usually ends up costing more in the long run. The end result
of system engineering is supposed to prevent this situation
from developing.
2. Test and Evaluation
The test and evaluation strategy is concerned with the
type, amount, and timing of testing. Testing could include
components, subsystems, and systems. Typical questions
include
:
1. How much testing is necessary?
2. How much test, analyze, and fix (TAAF) will be required,
and at what levels?
3. What test feedback and failure analysis procedures will
be used? [Ref. l:p. 3-6]a.
a. Discussion
Where we do our TECHEVAL and OPEVAL is just
important as how we conduct it . A case in point is how the dry
suit was tested.
On 10 June 1985, an OPEVAL was conducted on the dry
suit that is now in use. This dry suit was designed to provide
thermal protection for a diver in cold water. The dry suit is
an essential piece of support equipment. Without thermal




The NAVEODTECHCEN pier on the Potomac River was
chosen as the T&E site due to its proximity to the dive locker
and relatively cool water. However, unusually warm weather
caused air temperatures as high as 90°F on the surface and
water temperatures which varied from approximately 80°F on the
surface to 64°F on the bottom. The warm air temperatures in
particular caused problems with the fully suited divers during
both the pre-dive and post-dive periods.
The original plan had called for 38°F to 45°F water
temperature in the NAVEODTECHCEN hyperbaric chamber complex.
However, due to problems with the wet pot refrigeration
equipment, the temperature could not be reduced and the dives
were performed in 80°F water. The divers were compressed to
100 FSW equivalent pressure at average rates of 40 to 50 feet
per minute.
The results of this evaluation were as follows:
1. The dry suit that was selected established the
specifications for the first article that was tested by
the Experimental Diving Unit in 1987.
2. Positive points cited: easier to work/swim, easy to
don/doff, better mobility, "best suit ever worn", use in
all situations, durable, and "far superior to any other
suit ever worn."
3. Divers recommended that dry glove system be replaced
because they didn't provide enough dexterity. They
recommended that a wet glove arrangement be used as
opposed to a dry glove arrangement. [Ref. 9:pp. 1-10]
In response to a tasking by NAVSEA, the Experi-
mental Diving Unit conducted first article testing on the EOD
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Dry Suit MK 1 MOD 0, in November 1987. The objective of this
study was to evaluate the MK 16 MOD UBA along with the
equipment necessary to support a diver for the longest HEOj
Decompression Table in 4.4°C (40°F) water. The results were
that, " all dives were aborted for thermal considerations, the
first article EOD Dry Suit MK 1 MOD was inadequate to support
a diver in a long duration cold water dive ." [Ref. 9:p. 1]
The wet suit gloves that the original evaluators
liked because of their mobility and dexterity, offered little
thermal protection in cold water. All dives were terminated
because the divers were cold. The most common complaint was
painful hands or feet which were numb and nonfunctional after
90 minutes. In addition, none of the suits had a sufficient
air supply to prevent a suit squeeze to depths of 270 FSW
.
During this evaluation many dives had their dive profiles
changed as a result of suit squeeze. For thermal protection
it is necessary to have a layer of air in and around the
insulating material. If water pressure exceeds the pressure
within the dry suit, the result will be a suit squeeze
(extremely painful). [Ref. 10:pp. 1-7]
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3. Production
The production strategy is concerned with the
capability to produce hardware (and associated software) within
stated goals. The transition from development to production
is perhaps one of the most difficult problems facing the
Program Manager. It is necessary to ensure that the design is
mature and stable. [Ref. l:p. 3-7]
a. Discussion
Following delivery of the first three UBA
production units on 8 November 1984, several problems were
brought to light that subsequently delayed production and IOC.




2. Pressure Gauge and Hose Assembly.
3. Lee Valve (oxygen addition valve)
The Lee valve was the major component that delayed
production until a new manufacturer could be found for it. The
Lee valve was found to fail in the open position while adding
oxygen to the system. Instead of fixing this problem, the Lee
Manufacturing company decided to stop manufacturing this type
of valve. A new manufacturer was subsequently found and the
problem was resolved successfully. However, production of the
UBA was delayed approximately six months. As a result of this
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delay a new delivery schedule had to be established by the
Program Manager.
4. Deployment
The deployment strategy encompasses the field
installation, operation, and support of the product. Some of
the critical requirements include operation and support costs,
manning levels, readiness and capability rates, and training.
One of the first technical elements to be addressed in
examining supportabil ity is the maintenance concept, which
influences the number and types of personnel, training,
facility, and support system requirements. Strategic
approaches must be developed for acquiring the total System
Support Package (SSP), which includes spares, inventory, test
equipment, training, publications, and data. Other questions
to be addressed concern facility requirements and contractor
support. [Ref. l:p. 3-7]
a. Discussion
As the design and technical problems were being
corrected, attention was then diverted to the often overlooked
area of logistics support. Logistic support will be discussed
in the ILS section. However, the ILS portion of the MK 16
program was the weak link within the MK 16 program for various
reasons. One reason for this deficiency was the Integrated
Logistics Support Management Team (ILSMT) organization and how
it functioned. Principal members of ILSMT told the author that
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no regular meetings were scheduled and only on rare occasions
did the key members of the ILSMT ever meet. One individual
stated that he thought ILS was secondary to the goal of getting
an end item out to the fleet.
G. ACQUISITION RESOURCE CONCERNS
The five major resource concerns that shaped the
development of the MK 16 acquisition strategy and determined





5. Facilities. [Ref. l:p. 3-7]
These five major elements are discussed in the following
subsections
.
1. Personnel and Organization
The elements that should be considered in developing
a program management organization are listed as follows:
1. The skills needed in the program office.
2. The organizational structure of the program office and
its relationship to other service commands and DoD.




During the research for this thesis the author
evaluated the manning structure within the Program Management
Office, and found it deficient. The following paragraphs give
a detailed account, in chronological order, of the Program
Management Office manning problem.
On 16 May 1985, Mr. W. A. Tarbell (Deputy Commander
for Acquisition and Logistics) wrote a memorandum to SEA 06.
In the memorandum he stated, "I reviewed logistics support for
the MK 18 MOD Mine Detection and Neutralization System this
week and your Program Management Office (SEA 06X) folks have
done a good job." Continuing on he said, "However, I noted
that they are responsible for about 20 ACAT III and IV PROGRAMS
and I noted very few people assigned to manage these programs."
He ended his memorandum with, " I wonder if all the programs
assigned to SEA 06X are getting adequate management attention? "
[Ref. 11]
On 30 August 1985, the EOD program manager sent a
memorandum to SEA 06. In that memorandum he stated, "Admiral,
I urgently need your help in obtaining additional people for
the EOD Program Office." [Ref. 12] The Program Manager's
memorandum explained that within the last year and a half
preceding his request, the EOD Program Office experienced
significant growth in acquisition and life-cycle management
responsibilities without an accompanying growth in people. In
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regards to being undermanned the Program Manager ended his
memorandum with the following statement:
CNO and SECNAV involvement in the acquisition management
process at all levels since the disestablishment of NAVMAT
has greatly reduced our ability to tailor program
requirements at the sub-project level ... we are playing
a game of catch-up, we need more people to maintain control
under more direct oversight. [Ref. 12]
This was the first time the EOD Program Manager
went on record to document this manning problem. On 19 May
1987, SEA 06 established a policy for consistent and equitable
manning within SEA 06 Program Management Offices. SEA 06 gave
the following reason for creating this new manning policy,
"Since becoming SEA 06, I have been increasingly concerned
about the lack of consistency in our structure, staffing and
utilization of our Program Management Office." He went on to
say, "I directed a study to be conducted which reevaluated the
implementation of project management in SEA 06 and developed
a methodology for estimating Program Management Office staffing
requirements." [Ref. 13]
In 1987 the Program Manager submitted a new
staffing plan for the Program Management Office to SEA 06.
Figure 7, is the present staffing structure of the Program
Management Office. Figure 8, is the new staffing plan which
reflects the addition of 10 personnel needed to bring the EOD
Program Management Office into compliance with SEA 06's
memorandum. The manning level within the Program Management
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2. Schedule
"In many programs there is a pacing item or activity,
one that dictates or defines expected completion dates." [Ref .
l:p. 3-8] In the MK 16 program an example of this was the
oxygen addition valve. If risk analysis had been performed on
the oxygen addition valve, it would have revealed an item that
had the potential to delay production of the UBA. An
applicable strategy such as phase concurrency, combined testing
or parallel technology development, could then have been
developed to counter this problem. However, in regards to the
MK 16 program, when a material problem such as the oxygen
addition valve arose, the acquisition process stopped until the
problem was resolved.
3. Business and Financial
A business strategy defines the competitive and
contracting policy the program manager wants to follow in the
execution of a acquisition program. The request for proposal
(RFP) defines the contractual issues. The structure of the
RFP, the solicitation approach, use of data-rights clause, and
the source selection strategy make up the business strategy.
[Ref. l:p. 3-8]
a. Discussion
The concept of competition for Navy systems must
be viewed with respect to the leverage we enjoy as a single
buyer. Competition, in an economic sense, forces firms to
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adopt the most efficient production techniques and to undertake
long term planning and investments to reduce costs and increase
quality. In addition, it encourages contractors to recommend
design changes and performmance enhancements that improve
market position by lowering price, in lieu of cost increasing
engineering changes so typical of sole-source contracts. [Ref
.
14:pp. 1-24]
Research for this thesis revealed that the
acquisition strategy for the MK 16 did not have an effective
nor well thought out plan for competition. The failure to
develop a technical data package underscores the fact that
competition was not an integral part of the original
acquisition strategy. All MK 16 acquisition contracts have
been on a sole source basis.
4. Management Information
A management information strategy helps the Program
Manager establish a plan for monitoring the progress of the
program. "Accurate, timely, and complete information is an
important ingredient in the successful execution of any
management approach used by the Program Manager." [Ref. l:p.
3-8]
5. Facilities
"A facilities strategy considers the facility
requirements for establishing, modernizing, and certifying
production and operational capabilities." [Ref. l:p. 3-9]
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Productivity, cost reduction, surge capacity, and factory
capability are typical concerns. [Ref. l:p. 3-10]
H. ACQUISITION STRATEGY CRITERIA
For an acquisition strategy to provide the basis for
meeting program objectives and to aid in gaining program






The following five subsections discuss the above program
criteria requirements. Each one applies to the acquisition
strategy used for the MK 16, either directly or indirectly.
1. Realism
An acquisition strategy is realistic if the program
objectives are attainable and the strategic approach used can
be successfully implemented with reasonable assurance. It is
impossible to develop a realistic strategy with unrealistic
goals and objectives. One of the best ways of achieving
program reality is through the development of an acquisition




There were many pressures working against "realism"
within the MK 16 acquisition strategy. The first requirement
for a successful strategy is an accurate assessment of the
state of the art in all technology areas. Technological risk
was assessed as low in the MK 16 program, when in reality it
was high. As a result of this mistake the acquisition strategy
was flawed from the very beginning. A review of Figure 4, will
confirm this statement.
2. Stability
Acquisition stability is the characteristic that keeps
negative external or internal changes from seriously
influencing or delaying program progress. A good example of
an external change is a change in program funding. A decrease
in program funding might result in the reallocation of
resources and priorities within a Program Management Office or
in the cancelling of a program.
An example of a negative internal change is a constant
turnover of personnel within a Program Management Office. This
could lead to lack of continuity and accountability within a
Program Management Office.
These negative changes often result in cost, schedule,
or performance requirements that can potentially delay the
attainment of program objectives. "Frequently, when a major
change is made, such as in funding change, a downstream
40
parameter such as logistics support bears the brunt of the
change." [Ref. l:p. 3-14]
a. Discussion
Integrated logistic support bore the brunt of
changes within the MK 16 program. ILS will be discussed in
more detail in the section on ILSP.
3. Flexibility
"Flexibility is a characteristic of the acquisition
strategy related to the ease with which changes and failures
can be accommodated without significant changes in resource
requirements." [Ref. l:p. 3-17] If a program doesn't have
flexibility, any disruption can result in major problems for
the program, such as, instability, insufficient allocation of
resources and unrealistic approaches being taken to resolve
the problem.
a. Discussion
The acquisition strategy used for the MK 16 was
reactive rather than pro-active. When problems arose within
the program, progress frequently stopped until a solution was
found. A good example was the oxygen addition valve that
delayed production by approximately six months.
4. Resource Balance
The following definition of resource balance will help
the reader understand the importance of this concept in an
acquisition strategy:
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1. Resource balance is a condition of equilibrium between
and within major program objectives that are competing
for resources.
2. The achievement of cost, schedule, and technical
requirements uses resources of time, people, facilities,
and money, all of which are limited.
3. The degree of balance is not usually measured directly,
but it can be measured in terms of risk in meeting
objectives. In this sense, a balanced program is one
for which all the risks are approximately equal. [Ref.
l:p. 3-16]
The Program Manager must understand the priorities,
relationships, risks, and required resources for each
objective, if he does, then a balanced strategy can be
developed. [Ref. l:p. 3-16]
a. Discussion
The MK 16 program was not resource balanced. As
previously discussed, the manning level was a major problem
within the Program Management Office. In a balanced program,
resources can be allocated to achieve desired goals and
objectives in a uniform manner. Because of the manning level
within the EOD Program Management Office, the Program Manager
couldn't allocate personnel in a balanced manner to meet the
requirements of the MK 16 program. The result was that
predetermined objectives and goals weren't achieved. Figure
4, supports this statement.
5. Controlled Risk
Risk, as applied to an acquisition strategy, is the
probability that a program objective or goal, won't be
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achieved. The following list discusses the concept of risk in
an acquisition strategy:
1. Risk as applied to acquisition strategy, is a measure of
the probability and consequence of not achieving a mile-
stone or predetermined program goal
.
2. In general, as either the uncertainty or consequences
from not achieving a goal increases, so does the risk.
Both the uncertainty and the damage must be considered
in a risk analysis.
3. An acquisition strategy should be structured to identify
hazards and to allow safeguards to be developed to
overcome them. If enough analysis is done risk can be
reduced to an acceptable level.
[Ref. l:p. 3-20]
a. Discussion
Risk analysis was not conducted nor was it part of
the acquisition strategy. The Mk 16 UBA was considered a low
risk program because of the assumption that the MK 16 was a
redesign of the MK 15. As a result of this assumption the
Program Manager saw no need to structure the acquisition
strategy to deal with risk when it didn't exist. In reality,
however, the MK 16 program was a high risk program. The
section entitled, "MK 16 Acquisition Strategy" in chapter four,
will discuss why the MK 16 program was a high risk program.
I. ACQUISITION STRATEGY CONSTRAINTS AND LIMIATATIONS
The following are a few of the primary constraints and








The constraints and limitations listed above are discussed
in the next five subsections. Each of these constraints,
either directly or indirectly, affected the development and
execution of the MK 16 acquisition strategy.
1. Economic Constraints
The following is a definition of economic constraints:
Pressures exist to hold down program costs. Over the last
several years, cost has grown to be equal to, if not more
important than schedule, performance and supportability as
the major element of a system acquisition. The push for
competition, dual or second sourcing, component breakout,
af f ordabi 1 ity and other similar concepts/methods involved in
the production of systems have forced the Program Manager to
ensure incorporation of cost efficient methods into the
acquisition strategy. [Ref . 6:p. 93]
a. Discussion
To date, all contracts have been awarded to Rexnord
on a sole-source basis. The first buy was sole-source to
Rexnord because no other manufacturer wanted to bid on the
solicitation. After the contract was awarded to Rexnord, the
Program Manager decided to have Rexnord convert their drawings
to NAVSEA level III drawings. This was done, through a
modification to the original contract, after the original
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contract was awarded to Rexnord. The original contract only
called for level II drawings.
In 1984, the technical data package (TDP) was found
to be deficient because Rexnord was unable to meet the
requirements of DOD-STD-100 for level III drawings. The
drawings were then returned to the Government. Subsequently,
a contract was awarded to WESTINGHOUSE for $348,914.00 to
convert the Rexnord drawings to level III.
In 1986, the contract with WESTINGHOUSE expired
and the drawings were again returned to the Government, still
unfinished
.
On 10 April 1986, the Program Manager requested
authorization to award another contract to Rexnord (using other
than full and open competition). The request was approved and
the second contract was awarded to Rexnord on a sole-source
basis
.
The drawings that were mentioned previously are
still deficient and don't reflect the configuration of the MK
16. Numerous engineering changes have not been incorporated
into these drawings. This fact was discussed on 12 April 1989
at the quarterly logistic support meeting at NAVEODTECHCEN Code
45. Mr. Jesse M. Urquidez (Code 454) stated that the current
plan called for a competitive package to be put together, with
the engineering changes attached to the appropriate drawing,
for a competitive buy sometime in FY 91. If this competitive
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package is not handled correctly, it could become a
"contractor's dream come true!"
2. Political Constraints
The following guidance is provided in regards to
political constraints on an acquisition strategy:
1. The development and execution of an acquisition strategy,
can be significantly influenced by political concerns.
This influence can result from hearings held by congress,
or requirements imposed in the Defense Authorization or
Appropriation Bills.
2. Some of the many political concerns can include such
issues as the size, scope or cost of a program; the
overall level of defense expenditures; the state of the
economy; the condition and location of potential prime
and subcontractors; special interest group concerns and;
proposed basing schemes.
3. In order to develop a successful acquisition strategy,
the Program Manager must be able to anticipate the impact
that political pressures can have on the program. The
Program Manager must be able to calculate the political
ramifications of each strategy option considered as well
as the likelihood of its acceptance. [Ref. 6:p. 93]
3. Technical Constraints
The following discussion provides guidance on creating
a balanced acquisition strategy in regards to technical
constraints
:
1. Technical considerations frequently become the overriding
concern of personnel responsible for managing and
reviewing program progress.
2. The Program Manager's objective should be to strike a
balance between technical performance, program
costs/funding, schedule requirements and supportability
issues
.
3. The identification and categorization of all of the
technical issues which must be resolved during a
program's life cannot possibly be addressed in the early
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stages of the program. The objective at program
initiation should be to identify the types of issues
which need to be addressed, the methodology to be used
to address them and the phase of the acquisition process
when they must be considered. [Ref. 6:p. 93]
4. Schedule Constraints
Schedule constraints and the impact they have on the
development of an acquisition strategy are discussed below:
1. There is constant pressure to reduce the time it takes
to acquire and field new systems. If an IOC date has
been established, the strategy options available to the
Program Manager become restricted.
2. Scheduling requirements impact the development of an
acquisition strategy such as the scheduling of test and
evaluation activities, the programming of events
involving different fiscal years or types of funds (e.g.,
research and development versus production funds), and
establishing formal program reviews.
3. If a programs's acquisition strategy is dominated by
schedule constraints, many strategy options will be
eliminated. As an example, an inflexible IOC date would
require the Program Manager to force fit
design/development, and production activities into
perhaps an extremely tight schedule. [Ref. 6 : pp . 93-94]
a. Discussion
As was previously mentioned, the acquisition
strategy for the MK 16 was found to be reactive instead of pro-
active. The reason for this can be directly attributed to the
deficient manning level within the Program Management Office.
In a management environment like this, acquisition strategy
options and alternatives that could have improved the program
are viewed as a luxury, and were traded off to save time and
money in the achievement of a milestone or schedule. It is
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noteworthy to add that CINCPACFLT wanted the MK 16 delivered
no later than 1 June 1986 (CINCPACFLT MSG R140219Z Aug. 84).
The first operational units were delivered to fleet in November
1985.
5. Resource Constraints
What type and amount of resources a program has is
critical to the success or failure of an acquisition strategy.
The most important resources are money and knowledgeable
personnel . In his article, "Acquisition Strategy," Dr. Lamm
made the following statement:
The lack of other critical resources, however, such as access
to Government laboratories and test facilities, engineering
support, higher level organizational support, legal counsel,
business strategy support and technical/production skills,
can place severe limitations upon the execution of even the
most carefully structured acquisition strategy. [Ref. 6:p.
94]
a. Discussion
The great majority of DoD acquisition programs are
constrained by money. However, the major constraint in the Mk
16 program was insufficient personnel within the Program
Management Office and NAVEODTECHCEN Code 45 organization. As
previously stated, the EOD Program Management Office needs an
additional 10 personnel and Code 45 needs approximately 17 more
personnel. Tasks that normally would be handled by a GS-8, are
being done by GS-4 personnel in the Code 45 organization. It
is commendable that these personnel are willing to perform
tasks they weren't properly trained to do, nor monetarily
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rewarded for. However, in the long run this will become a
management problem. The Department Head who is in charge of
Code 45 (Major Kertis Peterson) has performed excellently,
however, no one man can solve the problem of being undermanned
by 17 people. Code 45 is currently documenting this manning
problem within NAVEODTECHCEN
.
J. ACQUISITION STRATEGY BENEFITS
Successful program management requires the continuing actions
of planning, organizing, directing, coordinating,
controlling, and evaluating the use of money, material,
staff, contractors, and facilities to achieve program
objectives within the constraints placed on the program.
[Ref. l:p. 3-1]
1. Discussion
If a Program Manager is unable to create an acquisition
strategy that takes into consideration the concepts previously
mentioned in this chapter, the result will be, "diversions from
program objectives, additional cost, schedule, and technical
problems during subsequent cycle phases." [Ref. l:p. 3-2]
K. INTEGRATED LOGISTICS SUPPORT
Logistics in the context of the system life-cycle involves
planning, analysis and design, testing, production,
distribution, and sustaining the support of a system
throughout the consumer use period. [Ref. 7:p. 5]
The different areas of logistic support and how they are
interrelated throughout the life-cycle of the system are shown


























Preliminary Design and Analysis















Design Data, Design Review,
Engineering Mockups and Prototype












































Logistics in the System Life Cycle (p. 7)
Source: Logistics Engineering and Management by
Benjamin S. Blanchard
50
activities highlighted in Figure 9. A detailed explanation
of this integrated logistics support model is provided in
Appendix B. An analysis of the logistic development process
depicted in Figure 9 will give the reader an understanding of
the importance of logistics in the life-cycle of a system. In
addition, the reader will gain an understanding of why logistic
requirements must be planned and integrated into the system
design concept from the very beginning of a program . [Ref.
7:p. 4-6]
Integrated logistic support is basically a management
function that provides the initial planning, funding and
controls which help to assure that the ultimate consumer (or
user) will receive a system that will not only meet
performance requirements, but one that can be expeditiously
and economically supported throughout its programmed life-
cycle. [Ref. 7:p. 11]
The steps highlighted in Figure 9, are critical to the
formulation, development, and execution of any acquisition
program. Each block can be "tailored" to satisfy the planning
requirements of any type of program. Figure 9 depicts a
thought process that integrates systems engineering and ILSP.
The result, when this model is correctly tailored and executed,
is system optimization. [Ref. 7:pp. 8-9]
1. Discussion
MK 16 logistic support problems first came to light in
late 1985. These problems were precipitated by the Program
Manager's decision not to conduct a LSA, ILS/system engineering
based strategy. The ILSP and the acquisition plan stated that
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a formal LSA for the MK 16 was not warranted because the MK 16
was merely a redesign of the MK 15. The Program Manager
reasoned in the ILSP that the support requirements of the MK
15 which had been validated through successful completion of
DT-111 TECHEVAL and OT-111 OPEVAL could also be applied to
the MK 16. The LSA section of the ILSP concluded with the
statement that, "the utilization of MK 15 experience and data
. . . would achieve the end objective of an LSA without the
additional expense and time of a formal LSA program." The
decision not to conduct a LSA was probably made because of
funding, schedule and Program Management Office manning
constraints. The repercussions of that decision began to be
felt in late 1986 when the Provisioning Parts List was deemed
to be unusable as a result of errors and the omission of
critical data such as: replacement factors; estimated prices;
shelf life codes; and maintenance factors.
Problems with logistic support began to affect the
fleet in early 1988. COMNAVSURFPAC indicated that significant
logistic support deficiencies existed within the MK 16
acquisition program. In addition, COMNAVSURFPAC also pointed
out that inadequacies in the MK 16 Logistics Support Program
had directly affected the readiness of operational units in a
negative manner.
To address the fleet problems, the first MK 16
logistics material support meeting was held by COMNAVSEASYSCOM
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at the NAVEODTECHCEN on 30 March 1988. The purpose of the
meeting was to identify and discuss logistic and material
support problems. Major milestones from the last ILSP, dated
1981, were presented to show program status. Attendees were
told by the Program Manager that, "the current MK 16 material
and logistic problems were the result of critical logistic
support milestones not being met."
Among the many issues addressed at that meeting, the
following are particularly noteworthy. The first issue was
whether or not to update the ILSP, since production had already
begun. In lieu of updating the ILSP, the meeting attendees
concluded that an Operational Logistics Support Summary should
be developed to define the operational support requirements.
The second issue was the material support date (MSD)
for the MK 16. As a result of continuing provisioning
problems, SPCC stated that it would not logistically support
the MK 16 until 1991. NAVEODTECHCEN Code 45 is now correcting
these provisioning problems.
The third issue was parts availability. The opera-
tional units were not receiving ordered parts. The Program
Manager reported that, "poor parts planning during the
development phases caused the present lack of spare parts."
Many users felt that an operational support kit consisting of
spare parts should always be provided with the MK 16 UBA. The
present plan calls for one operational support kit for every
53
four UBAs . The users felt that this was the most efficient
way of maintaining system availability.
The present logistic support plan calls for the
elimination of the operational support kit when MSD is
achieved. The inventory control point will then provide
centralized control for all spare part support. However, no
analysis has been done to determine the impact this action will
have on logistic support. The majority of users stated that
they were concerned with how long it took to receive spare
parts
.
An analysis might reveal that its more effective to
stock spares at the EODGROUP level rather than the EODTECHCEN
or retain the operational support kit concept. However, before
a final decision is made on eliminating the kits or stocking
spares in a centralized rather than a decentralized location,
a study needs to be conducted.
During discussions with various personnel from
NAVEODTECHCEN Code 45, the following question was asked by the
author, "how were the number of spares needed to support this
system determined?" The answer given was that estimates were
made. No analytical models were used in the development of
spare part requirements. The result was that some stockage
levels have exceeded demand while others failed to meet demand.
The goal is to have the correct amount and type of spares in
inventory at the lowest cost. The quantitative methods needed
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to perform this task are not difficult and any good logistician
should be able to use them in achieving an optimum economic
order quantity.
The fourth issue was Oj sensors. 293 failure analysis
reports (FARS) were submitted on sensors that were either not
within the specified operating parameters, leaking or had
broken wires. Rexnord stated that it came out with a gel -type
sensor which eliminated the problem of leaking, but the users
reported that the sensors were still leaking. The oxygen
sensor has caused more controversy than any other component of
the MK 16. This problem is presently under investigation by
Code 45.
In summation, the primary goal of these quarterly
logistic support meetings was to discuss MK 16 logistic support
problems and provide solutions in a "plan of action and
milestones" (POA&M) format. The secondary goal was the
improvement of communication between the Program Manager, the
inventory control point (NAVEODTECHCEN), and the fleet.
NAVEODTECHCEN Code 45 was tasked by NAVSEA with providing
quarterly reports on logistic and material support issues.
These quarterly reports have been very beneficial and have
resulted in the resolution of many MK 16 ILS problems. The
quarterly reports are the result of meetings between fleet
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"In dealing with the aspect of cost, one must address total
life-cycle cost." [Ref . 7:p. 66] Historically, the life-cycle
cost for a system has been portrayed in the following manner:
1. In the past, total system cost has not been too visible,
particularly those costs associated with system operation
and support
.
2. The cost visibility problem can be related to the
"iceberg effect" illustrated in Figure 10. One must
consider not only system acquisition cost, but other
costs as well. [Ref. 7:p. 66]
Poor Management
Figure 10
Total Life-Cycle Cost Visibility
Source: Logistics Engineering and Management by
Benjamin S. Blanchard
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Historically, when addressing total cost, experience has
shown that a major portion of the projected life-cycle cost
for a system is the result of decisions made during the early
phases of program planning and system design. These decisions
pertain to the evaluation of alternative use profiles,
maintenance and support policies, and level of repair concepts.
Thus, in dealing with economic factors, a life-cycle approach
is required. [Ref. 7:p. 66]
1. Discussion
The LCC data presented here was provided by NAVEODTECH-
CEN Code 45. The following is a list of estimated "sunk" costs
for the MK 16. This list includes all known costs for fielding
441 MK 16's. The list does not include the Gas Transfer System
or the Diver Thermal Protection Suit. Cost data on these
latter components was unavailable for inclusion in this list.
[Ref. 15]
ITEM/TASK COST
a. 441 MK 16 UBA's @ $41,550 each. $18,323,550
b. Ill Operational Support Kits
<§ $46,280 each. $ 5,137,080
c. Westinghouse Engineering drawing
contract ("K"). $ 385,000
d. Oxygen Cleaning/Depot Repair
Facility. (Note: includes initial
stock of DLR parts). $ 3,101,075
e. "K" item acceptance, Production
Engineering and Certification.
f. O&M manual revision "K"
.
g. Physical Configuration Audit and





h. Spares "K" through NRCC (Note: to
replace spares issued to fleet). $ 293,000
i. Oxygen Sensors (Note: only through
FY 90). $ 200,000
j. Provisioning Parts buy by SPCC
(Note: this is an estimate based on
current prices). $ 6,481,000
k. 5 Year overhaul of first 96 MK 16
UBAs <§ $12,700 each (Note: $6,000
for parts and $6,700 for labor). $ 1,221,120
1. Depot Level Repair costs until
MSD, approximately $350,000 per
year, estimate 2 years till MSD. $ 700,000
m. Product Improvement Program (PIP). $ 900,000
n. RD&T (Note: this is an approximate
cost from data gathered). $ 2,700,000
TOTAL $40,113,825
During phone conversations between the Program Manager
,
Code 45 and the author, the following information was provided.
If 15 years was assumed as the estimated useful life for the
MK 16, an additional cost of approximately seven to ten million
dollars could be added to the previous total of $40,113,825.
[Ref. 15] The new LCC total would then be somewhere between
$47,113,825 and $50,113,825. If we use $50,113,825 for the LCC
for the MK 16, simple computations quickly reveal that
acquisition of 441 MK 16 UBA's make up only 36.57% of the LCC
and ILS makes up 63.43% of the LCC of the system. This
confirms the concept contained in Figure 10, that ILS is the
lower part of the iceberg, unseen until the bill comes in.
In summation, the recent combination of economic
trends, cost growth experienced for many systems, and budget
reductions within DoD, has created an awareness of total system
cost. In addition, the acquisition costs of operating and
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maintaining systems in existence are increasing at an alarming
rate. The end result is that fewer dollars are available to





The purpose of this thesis was to analyze the strategic
planning and management control processes used by different DoD
agencies in taking this program from concept to full
operational capability. From this analysis, principal "lessons
learned" in fielding this ACAT III system were developed and
discussed, in the hope that subsequent systems could be fielded
more effectively.
1. Discussion
From the research conducted the following "lessons
learned" are presented:
1. Risk analysis is critical to the development of an
acquisition strategy.
2. The system acquisition process of integrating LSA/ILS
into a system engineering approach should never be
traded-of f
.
3. To be effective and in control of the management process,
organizations must be properly staffed.
The following sections discuss these three interrelated
"lessons learned" in more detail:
a. MK 16 Acquisition Strategy
It is noteworthy to add that when the R&D effort
first started, the task of making the MK 16 nonmagnetic and
acoustically quiet seemed an easy goal. In practice,
nonmagnetic and acoustic design requirements fathered a host
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of engineering challenges, such as meeting military standards
for low measure magnetic signature and changing the oxygen add
valve from a solenoid (which makes a clicking sound) to the
acoustically quiet piezoelectric valve. [Ref. 4:p. 9]
The acquisition strategy for the MK 16 evolved from
the assumption that the MK 16 was merely a redesign of the MK
15. Subsequently, technical risk was determined to be low
when, in reality, it was high. As a direct result of this
assumption, the acquisition strategy and plans were structured
for a low risk program. The MK 16 had no alternate plans to
deal with technical problems in an effective manner. When a
technical problem arose the program simply stopped until the
problem was corrected. For example, finding a replacement for
the Grindley oxygen addition valve resulted in a six month
delay in the IOC date.
The product improvement program (PIP), which was
initiated by Code 45 in 1988, had the goal of increasing
reliability and decreasing maintenance costs. Since this
function wasn't performed up front by the Program Manager, Code
45 is now doing it after the fact and at a higher cost.
Increased cost in acquisition programs has received
a lot of special attention, particularly in light of recent
reductions in DoD's budget. If the acquisition strategy for
the MK 16 included pre-planned product improvement (PI), a
cost savings could have been realized. Pre-planned product
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improvement could have performed the same function as PIP but
at a lower cost.
In addition, an innovative approach to competition
could have been planned into the acquisition strategy from the
beginning. The failure to develop a technical data package
underscores the fact that competition was not an integral part
of the original acquisition strategy.
Current DoD system acquisition policies don't
account for the fact that system acquisition is concerned
basically with an industrial process. The acquisition process
for the MK 16 was a technical process focused on the design,
test, and production of a system. It will either fail or
develop problems if these processes are not done in a
controlled and disciplined manner. The acquisition strategy
is the mechanism that performs this function of control and
discipline. The Program Manager has to realize that the
acquisition process is a continuum of interrelated and
interdependent disciplines. Incorrect assessments of program
risk will result in a failure to do well in other areas of the
acquisition process. When this happens, as it did with the MK
16 program, a high risk program results, whose equipment is
deployed later than originally planned and at a higher cost.
[Ref. 16:pp. 68-69]
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b. MK 16 Integrated Logistics Support
The integration of LSA and system engineering, as
previously mentioned, is an acquisition system process that can
be tailored to the needs of a program. It is a thought process
towards system optimization. When this process was deleted
from the acquisition strategy, money and time were saved, but
what was saved up front was lost as the program progressed
through the phases of the acquisition cycle. The following
list describes some of the present problems with material and
logistic support for the MK 16:
1. Since the ILSP of 1981 was never updated, the Program
Manager decided that a Operational Logistics Support
Summary (OLSS) should be done to define the MK 16
operational support requirements. The OLLS will be
delivered in 1989.
2. The material support date (MSD) , which was originally
scheduled for 1983, will not be achieved until 1991.
3. Both EODGROUP ONE and TWO are concerned about material
and logistic support problems since only 60% of the MK
16 inventory is currently operational
.
4. The depot and organizational stockage levels were made
using "estimates" rather than quantitative methods.
5. $348,000 was spent for a technical data package (TDP)
that still does not meet military standards for level III
drawings
.
6. A study needs to be conducted to determine location and
stockage levels for of spares required to support the
MK 16 UBA. In addition, a study needs to be done to
determine if spare parts should be centrally or
decentrally located once MSD is achieved and if
operational support kits should still be supplied once
MSD is achieved.
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The fleet now has a system that satisfies an
operational requirement. However, the bill for maintaining and
supporting this system could have been lower if an integrated
LSA and system engineering approach was used in the development
of the MK 16. When it arrives, the end-user will have to pay
the price for what was saved up front.
Reliability and maintainability are inherent design
attributes, however, no trade-off analysis was done to achieve
an optimum system. The reason for this was that these factors
were locked-in as a result of early program decisions. The
factors of reliability and maintainability determine the amount
and frequency of maintenance for the MK 16. There is an
inverse relationship between reliability and maintenance. If
reliability was increased for the MK 16, maintenance
requirements at the depot and organizational levels would have
decreased. The bottom line is that time and money would have
been saved because of a concurrent reduction in preventive and
corrective maintenance for the MK 16. In addition, not as many
spares would have been needed to support the MK 16. Less
inventory would have been needed to support the MK 16 and, as
a result, costs would have been reduced over the life-cycle of
the system. However, there is one problem that has to be dealt
with when specific program characteristics like reliability are
increased. The Program Manager has to be able to show that the
extra cost involved with an increase in reliability will save
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enough in the cost of maintaining and supporting the system so
that the MK 16 will cost less over its life-cycle. This is
not a difficult task but it does require a properly manned
Program Management Office with qualified personnel,
c. Manning within the PMO and Code 45
The majority of problems discussed here and in
chapter three can be attributed directly or indirectly to the
fact that the Program Manager was undermanned by 10 personnel
and NAVEODTECHCEN Code 45 by 17 personnel. That these two
organizations have accomplished as much as they have is a
credit to the personnel within them.
In conversations with many Program Managers, the
one piece of advice given over and over was, "surround yourself
with good people and give them the freedom to do the job."
However, in an environment where the program is undermanned,
it's unrealistic to expect that the "few" can do the job of
many
Manning within the Program Management Office: If
a Program Manager is placed in an environment that is
constrained by manning, cost, and schedule considerations, the
result will be the development of an acquisition strategy that
reflects these constraints. The stability and effectiveness
of a Program Management Office will also be affected by the
number of Program Managers assigned to a program over time.
The MK 16 program has had six Program Managers over a 13-year
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period. The average tour length for each Program Manager was
2.17 years. The policy for tour lengths has recently been
changed to three years. This change should have a positive
effect on the acquisition process within the Explosive Ordnance
Disposal Program Management Office.
Manning within NAVEODTECHCEN Code 45: The
integration of support into the design process is a complex
endeavor. Successful integration requires that the ILS manager
take a strong leadership role in both system engineering and
ILS processes. This was a major weakness within the MK 16
program and can't be completely attributed to the fact that
Code 45 was undermanned by 17 personnel
.
The Integrated Logistics Support Management Team
(ILSMT) organization didn't function as designed. Conversa-
tions with various members of the Integrated Logistics Support
Management Team (ILSMT) revealed that meetings were not held
on a regular basis to discuss logistic support matters. In
addition, various members of the ILSMT felt that logistic
support was of secondary importance to getting the UBA hardware
out to the fleet.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
Program Manager: The manning structure of the Explosive
Ordnance Disposal Program Management Office is deficient. The
EOD Program Management Office is undermanned. An additional
10 people, are required to bring it into compliance with SEA
06' s program management manning document. The required
qualifications for these additional people are provided in
Figure 8. During the research for this thesis, deficient
manning within the Program Management Office was found to be
directly or indirectly responsible for the majority of MK 16
material and logistic problems discussed in this paper. This
manning problem, which was first documented on 30 August 1985,
still has not been resolved.
The acquisition strategy that was developed for the MK 16
wasn't structured as a strategic document. Short-term planning
was stressed rather than long-term planning. In defense of the
Program Manager, it's difficult to develop a strategic plan
when all of the program management resources were being used
just to achieve the next program milestone. This management
problem was expressed by another Program Manager when he said,
"Admiral ... we are playing a game of catch-up, we need more
people to maintain control under more direct oversight." [Ref .
12]
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Every Program Manager realizes that he is the one who is
responsible and held accountable for the failure or success of
a program. However, every successful Program Manager knows,
that to succeed, one needs an effective and fully manned
professional Program Management Office staff. Being
undermanned by approximately 48% results in an management
environment where the Program Manager can't plan the work and
then work the plan. One of the cardinal rules for a Program
Manager is to organize resources to fit the program. However,
given the previously documented manning constraint, the result
was a program organized to fit the resources. This was the
management approach used for the MK 16 program. The first
approach results in program optimization while the second often
results in suboptimization
.
EODTECHCEN Code 45: This organization is undermanned by
17 personnel . This number was derived from an internal manning
review conducted by the department head of Code 45. However,
a formal manning review should be done since there is no
overall manning document similar to the SEA 06 manning
directive that can be cited for manning guidance.
As a direct result of this manning problem, individuals
are performing tasks they have not been trained to do, nor are
monetarily rewarded for. In the long run, this will become a
management problem for the organization. The majority of ILS
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problems that the MK 16 has experienced are directly or
indirectly related to the manning level within Code 45.
ILS Management Techniques in System Engineering: LSA was
one of the management techniques that was traded-off along with
system engineering, to save time and money. As previously
mentioned, this was probably the result of, organizing a
program to fit the resources. Integrating LSA/ILS into the
system engineering process would have resulted in the
enhancement of the system development process and ensured the
timely influence of support requirements on design. [Ref . 17 :p.
4-8] Since, this was never done, the result was less than
optimum logistic support for the MK 16. The management
techniques mentioned above should never be traded-off.
B . RECOMMENDAT ION S
Program Management Office: Take appropriate action to
bring the manning structure of the EOD Program Management
Office into compliance with SEA 06's Program Management Office
Manning Document, as shown in Figure 8.
Add the Material Logistics Support XX32P subspecialty code
to the position of Director, SEA 06X (an 05 billet). Appendix
A, describes some of the educational skills a graduate of the
Material Logistic Support curriculum at the Naval Postgraduate
School can bring to the EOD Program Manager billet. The
strategic importance of the SEA 06X billet requires that only
69
the "best" personnel from the Special Operations community
should be assigned to this billet.
NAVEODTECHCEN Code (45): Take appropriate action to
conduct a formal manning review of Code 45, and hire additional
personnel as indicated by the manning review.
The Department Head, Code 45, should be a Certified
Professional Logistician (CPL) or equivalent. The research
for this thesis revealed that an experienced logistician with
the appropriate background is needed within the NAVEODTECHCEN
organization. Code 45 is the department where this expertise
should reside. Code 45 should not be headed by an engineer
who has no logistics background for the following reason:
engineers are hardware oriented and view logistics as a
downstream effort. The bottom line is that LSA/ILS should be
a Code 45 function and systems engineering should be a Code 50
function. The result will be an improvement in logistic
support and acquisition system development.
ILS Management Techniques in System Engineering: Strongly
recommend that the model described in Appendix B be used in
the development and execution of all acquisition programs. If
the goal of a Program Manager is system optimization, the
integration of ILS into the system engineering process will
achieve it. This process is essential to the success of a
program . To make this happen, a real time iterative
relationship between the ILS process and the product definition
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(design) process is necessary. ILS program success hinges on
how the readiness and supportability characteristics are
designed into the system during early development. The system
engineering process provides a framework for the material
system to acquire the desired supportability characteristics.
"System engineering, when done properly, integrates the effects
of logistic disciplines such as survivability, reliability, and
maintainability within the system design." [Ref . 17:p. 4-1]
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APPENDIX A
DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE SCIENCES
MASTER OF SCIENCE IN MANAGEMENT
MATERIAL SUPPORT CURRICULUM
EDUCATIONAL SKILL REQUIREMENTS
Upon graduation, the student will have acquired these skills:
1. Thorough understanding of managerial theory and
principles
.
2. Thorough knowledge of organizational planning,
coordinating, and control systems: diagnosis, design,
implementation, and operation.
3. Thorough knowledge of the life-cycle of costing, cost-
benefit analysis, optimization techniques, and
probability models and statistics.
4. Thorough knowledge of the life-cycle of systems:
research, development, production, provisioning,
operation, maintenance and logistic support.
5. Knowledge of the theories and principles of physical
distribution and production.
6. Knowledge of the civil service system, career planning
and manpower requirements determination as related to
the formulation and execution of logistic policy.
7. Knowledge of management information systems and their
efficient and effective use in the Navy.
8. General knowledge of systems design and analysis theory
and practice including reliability, maintainability,
configuration management, systems interpretation,
quality assurance, and systems performance measurement.
9. General familiarity with logistics support for
operational and contingency planning.
10. Understand the structure and process of DON/DoD




11. Understanding of concepts of systems acquisition and
application of project management with the process.
12. Understanding of all phases of the acquisition process




The following paragraphs describe the integrated logistic
support model/process highlighted in figure 9.
Figure 9, blocks 1 and 2. Given a specific need, the
system operational parameters, mission profiles, deployment,
utilization, effectiveness figures of merit, maintenance
constraints, and environmental requirements, will then be
defined. Effectiveness figures of merit include: maintenance
constraints; availability; dependability; reliability; and
maintainability. When this information is used, the end result
is the definition of the system maintenance concept and
development of a system level specification . It is important
to remember that the operational requirements and the
maintenance concept are the basic determinants of logistic
support resources. [Ref. 7:p. 7]
Figure 9, blocks 3 and 4 . Major operational, test,
production, and support functions are identified, and
qualitative requirements for the system are then allocated as
design criteria. The design criteria or constraints are
allocated to the significant levels of prime equipment as well
as the applicable elements of support (i.e., test and support
equipments, facilities, etc.). Those requirements that include
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Logistics in the System Life Cycle (p. 7)
Source: Logistics Engineering and Management by
Benjamin S. Blanchard
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Figure 9, blocks 5 and 6 . The boundaries that were
established by the design criteria, alternative prime mission
equipment and support configurations are evaluated through
trade-off studies, and a preferred approach is selected. For
each alternative, a logistic support analysis is accomplished
to determine the required resources for that alternative. As
a result of some trade-off study iterations, a prime mission
equipment configuration and support policy are chosen. [Ref.
7:p. 8]
Figure 9, blocks 7, 8, and 9 . The prime mission equipment
configuration is then evaluated by a LSA effort which
identifies the logistic resources needed to support it. The
system configuration is then reviewed in terms of its expected
overall effectiveness and capability to cost-effectively
satisfy the statement of need. The ultimate output leads to
the development of sub-system specifications and lower-level
specifications which form the basis for the detail design.
[Ref. 7:p. 8]
Figure 9, blocks 10, 11 and 12 . During the design process,
direct assistance is provided to design engineering personnel
in areas such as reliability, maintainability, supportability
,
and human factors. These tasks include the interpretation of
criteria; accomplishment of special studies; participation in
the selection of equipment and suppliers; accomplishment of
predictions (reliability and maintainability); participation
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in formal and informal design reviews; and participation in the
test and evaluation of engineering models and prototypes. An
in-depth logistic support analysis, based on released design
data, results in the identification of specific support
requirements in terms of tools, test and support equipment,
spare/repair parts, personnel quantities and skills, training
requirements, technical data, facilities, transportation,
packaging, and handling requirements. The logistic support
analysis at this stage provides the following program data:
1. An assessment of the prime equipment design for
supportability and potential cost/system effectiveness.
2. A basis for the provisioning and acquisition of specific
support items. [Ref. 7:p. 8]
Figure 9, blocks 13,14,15, and 16 . Prime mission equipment
items are then produced and/or constructed, tested, and
deployed or phased into full-scale operational use. Logistic
support elements are acquired, tested, and phased into
operation on an as needed basis. Throughout the operational
life-cycle of the system, logistics data are collected to
provide an assessment of system cost effectiveness and an early
identification of operating or maintenance problems. In
addition, this data becomes the baseline for the reprovisioning
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